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Abstract
The spontaneous behavioral changes of the agents during an epidemic can have significant
effects on the delay and the prevalence of its spread. In this work, we study a social distancing
game among the agents of a population, who determine their social interactions during the
spread of an epidemic. The interconnections between the agents are modeled by a network
and local interactions are considered. The payoffs of the agents depend on their benefits
from their social interactions, as well as on the costs to their health due to their possible
contamination. The information available to the agents during the decision making plays a
crucial role in our model. We examine two extreme cases. In the first case, the agents know
exactly the health states of their neighbors and in the second they have statistical information
for the global prevalence of the epidemic. The Nash equilibria of the games are studied and,
interestingly, in the second case the equilibrium strategies for an agent are either full isolation
or no social distancing at all. Experimental studies are presented through simulations, where
we observe that in the first case of perfect local information the agents can affect significantly
the prevalence of the epidemic with low cost for their sociability, while in the second case they
have to pay the burden of not being well informed. Moreover, the effects of the information
quality (fake news), the health care system capacity and the network structure are discussed
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and relevant simulations are provided, which indicate that these parameters affect the size,
the peak and the start of the outbreak, as well as the possibility of a second outbreak.
1 Introduction
The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic is one of the most significant events of this era. It affects
many sectors of human daily life, it indicates the inefficiency of many health care systems and it
leads to state interventions in the functioning of the society through urgent measures, to economic
depression and to human behavioral changes. Different states followed significantly different strate-
gies to contain the pandemic and achieved respectively different levels of success. However, as the
pandemic progresses, the interest about its nature, its dynamics and the need to control it made
epidemiology a scientific field known to almost everyone and its terminology used daily by the media
and included in many conversations. Humans spontaneously react to the emergence of Covid-19,
following or disrespecting the state directions and legislation, adaptively adjusting their behavior
based on their perceived risk. Thus, a question naturally arises: How this spontaneous behavioral
change of humans affects the prevalence of the disease and under what assumptions would it be
effective in reducing the spread of the outbreak?
Humankind has always been haunted by epidemics, some of which have been recorded from
historians, such as the plague in ancient Athens (430BC) and the Black Death in medieval Europe.
So, epidemiology has concerned a lot of scientists during the ages and mathematical models for this
field were first developed in the 18th century [1]. Nowadays, the most prevalent approach in epidemic
modeling is the compartmental models, introduced a century ago [2],[3]. These models assume that
there exist several compartments where an agent can belong (e.g. Susceptible-Infected-Recovered)
and derive ordinary differential equations for the description of the dynamics of the population
in each compartment. A main assumption for that analysis to hold is the well mixing of the
population. However, there is enough evidence from social and other kinds of human networks that
this assumption does not hold in many cases.
Due to that fact, novel approaches in epidemic modeling take into consideration the hetero-
geneous networked structure of human interconnections [4]. A branch of these approaches uses
results from the percolation theory to estimate the spread of the epidemic [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Another
branch, that is gaining a lot of attention [10], is the agent-based models [11, 12], which consider
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several parameters of each agent profile (e.g. residence, age, mobility pattern) and run computer
simulations for large populations of such agents to estimate the spread of the disease. There exist
also several recent works [13, 14, 15] which take into consideration the networked structure of hu-
man interconnections and they derive the -compartmental- models they use, through a mean-field
approach.
Regardless of its derivation and its mathematical formulation, the usefulness of epidemic mod-
eling is to guide states and/or individuals in taking the right protective measures to contain the
epidemics. These measures, besides the efforts to develop appropriate meditation, can be roughly
organized into two categories: vaccination [13, 14], [16, 17, 18, 19], [20, 21] and behavioral changes
[22, 23, 24, 25, 26], [27, 28, 29, 30], [31, 32, 33]. In the second case, the actions taken by the agents
may vary from usage of face masks and practice of better hygiene to voluntary quarantine, avoidance
of congregated places, application of preventive medicine and other safe social interactions.
In both cases, a very important fact that determines the effectiveness of the protective measures
is that the agents make rational choices with regard to the self-protective activities they adopt by
comparing the costs and benefits of these actions. Even in the case that a central authority imposes
a policy, it is often up to agents to fully comply with this or not, even if they will have to pay a high
cost if they get caught. From these considerations game theory arises as a natural tool to model
and analyze the agents behavior with respect to the adoption of protective measures. Many recent
studies on this field incorporate a game theoretic analysis [16, 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 20,
35, 21, 36, 37, 38], some of which are summarized in [39]. It should be pointed out here, that the
assumption of rational agents does not always hold true, since in many cases the agents decisions
are not based on the maximization of their personal utility. Moreover, in the cases it holds it is a
“double-edged sword” [20], because self-interest leads the agents to adopt strategies different than
the ones which maximize group interest [35, 21, 36, 37, 38]. Another main characteristic of game-
theoretic approaches is the crucial role of information available to the agents for their decision. The
remarkable impact of information on the epidemic outbreaks has been pointed out in [31, 32, 33],
where the authors consider an extra dynamic modeling the spread of information, coupled with the
contagion dynamics. The informed agents are supposed to alter their behavior and affect this way
the disease prevalence.
Following the research directions presented in the previous paragraphs, and specifically the
game-theoretic approaches for the modeling of behavioral changes [27, 28, 29, 30],[32], we propose
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and analyze a game-theoretic model for social distancing in the presence of an epidemic. Our model
differs from [27, 28, 29, 30],[32] since it takes under consideration the networked structure of human
interconnections and the locality of interactions, without attempting a mean-field approach. Each
agent is considered to have her own state variables and information and choosing her action based
on these - so it could be characterized an agent-based approach. Moreover, the actions of the
agents affect the intensity of their relations with their neighbors and use or do not use the available
connections. Changes in the topology of the network have been considered as a phenomenon in
[40, 41, 42], but not from a game-theoretic perspective where the agents can choose rationally which
connections to use and induce this way an “active” topology. Furthermore, there exist several works
on game-theoretic models which consider the networked structure of human interconnections, such
as [20, 33, 34, 43], where the strategy adoption is based on imitation of ones neighbors. Contrary to
that, in our model the agents do not imitate the most effective strategy of their neighborhood, but
design their best response based on the available information. We consider two different information
patterns: perfect local information for the states of ones neighbors and statistical information for
the global prevalence of the epidemic and investigate the different effects of these patterns.
Through the analysis of the proposed model we get several results. At first, we observe that
in the case of perfect local information the agents can affect significantly the prevalence of the
epidemic with low cost for their sociability, while in the case of statistical information they have to
pay the burden of not being well informed. Secondly, in the case the agents have only statistical
information, each agent’s action is either full isolation or no social distancing at all. Lastly, we
investigate, through experimental studies, the effects of the information quality (fake or biased
news), the health care system capacity and the network structure and we conclude that these
parameters affect the size, the peak and the start of the outbreak, as well as the possibility of a
second outbreak.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model for the epidemic outbreak
and for the social distancing game between the agents is introduced. In section 3 we analyze the
game for the case that the agents have perfect local information for the states of their neighbors.
In section 4 we analyze the game for the case that the agents have statistical information for the
global prevalence of the epidemic. In section 5 we present simulations for the games with the two
different information patterns and compare the results. A discussion follows in section 6, where
several variations of the problem are considered, such as experimentation on various network types
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[44]-[45], the impact of fake information and of the finite capacity of a health care system and
related simulations are presented and annotated.
2 The model
We denote by G = (V,E) an undirected graph, where V = {1, ..., n} is the set of its nodes repre-
senting the agents and E ⊂ V × V is the set of its edges indicating the social relations between the
agents. A = {aij} is the adjacency matrix of the graph i.e., aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, otherwise aij = 0.
Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} is the neighborhood of agent i, and N¯i = Ni ∪ {i}. di =
∑
j∈Ni aij is the
degree of node i, that is the number of her neighbors. We consider also a matrix S = {sij}, with
the same sparsity pattern with the adjacency matrix A, which indicates the desire of each agent to
meet with each one of her neighbors.
Social distancing is one of the most effective behavioral changes that people can adopt during
an epidemic outspread. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the choice to adopt this altered
behavior is, in many cases, up to the agents. So, we consider a social distancing game, which is
repeated at each day during the outspread of the epidemic. The actions of the agents model the
intensity of the relations with each one of their neighbors they choose to have at each day. So,
denoting by k the current day, the action of agent i is a vector of length equal to the number of her
neighbors given by:
ui(k) = [uij1(k)...u
i
jdi
(k)] ∈ [0, 1]di , (1)
where:
Ni = {j1, ..., jdi}.
According to the strategies chosen by the agents we have an induced weighted adjacency matrix
W (k) = [wij(k)] for the network, which indicates the meeting probabilities between two neighbors
at day k, where wij(k) have the following form:
wij(k) =
 0 , if aij = 0uij(k)uji (k) , if aij = 1 (2)
We consider that each agent has a health state consisted of two variables xi(k), which indicates
if the agent has been infected before day k and ri(k), which indicates the duration of her infection
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and consequently if she has recovered. Here we assume that all the infected agents recover after R
days.
The vector x0 = [x0i ] indicates the initial conditions for the xi state of the agents. The probability
p0x indicates the distribution of the initial conditions, which are i.i.d. random variables:
x0i =
 0 ,w.p. 1− p0x1 ,w.p. p0x (3)
The vector r0 = 0n indicates the initial conditions for the ri state of the agents.
These states evolve as follows:
xi(k + 1) =
 xi(k) ,w.p.
∏
j∈Ni(1− wij(k)pcxj(k)X{rj(k)<R})
1 , otherwise
(4)
ri(k + 1) =
 ri(k) + xi(k) , if ri(k) < RR , if ri(k) = R (5)
where R is the duration of the recovery period.
The probabilities wij(k)p
cxj(k)X{rj(k)<R} indicate the possibility to have a meeting at day k
and get infected by another agent. That agent can transmit the disease if she has been infected
(xj(k) = 1) and has not recovered yet (rj(k) < R)), which is shown with the use of the characteristic
function:
X{rj(k)<R} =
 1 , if rj(k) < R0 , if rj(k) = R
Remark 1. In this simple model, which is a discrete analogue of the SIR model on graphs, we
assume that every infected agent recovers. That is to avoid changes in the graph topology, which
would make the analysis of the game much more difficult. We expect this to cause minor differences
in the case of an epidemic with low mortality.
In order to model the probable contamination of an agent j by her neighbor agent i, we make
a similar assumption with the mean field approach [15], where the authors assume that the graph
topology has no loops and there is no correlation between the states of the agents. Thus, the
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contamination probability can be expressed as a function of the well known basic reproduction
number R0:
pc(R0) = 1− (1− R0
d¯
)
1
R . (6)
Similar derivations for the probabilities that govern the transmission of the disease over networks
of interconnected agents are existing in the relevant bibliography, such as [5].
We assume that the agents choose rationally their actions, based on the available information,
by maximizing their payoffs. These payoffs are considered to depend solely on the benefits from
the social interactions between the agents and on the costs to their health due to possible contam-
ination. In reality, the decision of a behavioral change depends also on socioeconomic and ethical
considerations, which are omitted in this first approach, for the sake of simplicity. So, in our case
the instantaneous payoffs depend on two terms. The first one indicates the satisfaction that each
agent derives by the interaction with her neighbors, these benefits differ between her neighbors.
The second term shows the costs an agent suffers if she has been infected. Since the agent does not
know her health state the next day, she tries to estimate it based on the available information. The
parameters Gi indicate the importance of the infection for each agent. We divide the agents into
two groups: the vulnerable (large Gi) and the ones who are non-vulnerable (small Gi). The game
is in fact dynamic since the payoffs depend on the evolving health states of the agents. However,
the agents are considered to be myopic and able to predict just a day ahead so the payoffs have the
following form at each day:
Ji(k) =
∑
j∈Ni
siju
i
j(k)u
j
i (k)−GiE{xi(k + 1)|Ii(k)}X{ri(k+1)<R} (7)
where Ii(k) is the information available to agent i at day k. The agents decide what action to take
based on this information. So, the actions are, in fact, strategies of the available information:
ui(k) = γi(Ii(k)) (8)
3 Perfect local state feedback information
We first study the case where the agents have perfect local state feedback information. That is,
agents know exactly their current health state and the current health states of their neighbors before
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taking the decision to meet them or not:
IFi (k) = {xj(k), rj(k) : j ∈ N¯i}. (9)
In order to analyze the social distancing game under the perfect local state feedback information
(9), we follow a step-wise analysis, considering a static, one-step game. All the time indexes,
indicating the days, will be omitted during this analysis. Based on the information 9 we can
explicitly calculate the conditional expectation of each agent’s next state E{x+i |Ii}:
E{x+i |Ii} = xi
∏
j∈Ni
(1− wijpcxjX{rj<R}) + (1−
∏
j∈Ni
(1− wijpcxjX{rj<R}))
since from (8) the strategies are measurable on the sigma fields defined by x, so E{uij|x} = uij.
Thus, the payoffs have the following form:
Ji =
∑
j∈Ni
siju
i
ju
j
i −
[
Gi(xi − 1)
∏
j∈Ni
(1− wijpcxjX{rj<R}) +Gi
]
X{r+i <R}. (10)
Proposition 1. The strategy profile u = 0∑ di is a Nash equilibrium for the game with perfect local
state feedback, since it results to indifference for all the agents.
However, we can observe the existence of other Nash equilibria.
Proposition 2. The best response of each agent always contains a point in {0, 1}di, i.e. the vertices
of the action space. Therefore, there is no strict Nash equilibrium in [0, 1]
∑
di \ {0, 1}∑ di
Proof. We calculate the first and second partial derivatives of Ji:
∂Ji
∂uij
= uji
sij +Gi(xi − 1)X{r+i <R}pcxjX{rj<R} ∏
k∈Ni\{j}
(1− uikuki pcxkX{rk<R})

∂2Ji
(∂uij)
2
= 0
for all j ∈ Ni, so:
∇2Ji = 0 (11)
and thus Ji is a harmonic function. So, form the maximum principle for harmonic functions on
compact sets ([46] chapter 4) we conclude that the local maxima of Ji with respect to ui are on the
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boundary of [0, 1]di . Applying successively the maximum principle for the faces and the edges of
the hypercube [0, 1]di , observing that Ji is still harmonic on each face of the hypercube with respect
to the free variables on that face (the uij that are not fixed to 0 or 1), we conclude that the best
response of each agent always contains a point in {0, 1}di .
Remark 2. If agent i is infected, xi = 1 and ri < R, then Ji =
∑
j∈Ni siju
i
ju
j
i − Gi and if she
has been recovered, ri = R, it is assumed that she cannot get infected again. So, in these cases,
an optimal strategy for her is uij = 1, ∀j ∈ Ni, since if uji = 1 =⇒ uij = 1 and if uji = 0 she is
indifferent so she can also choose uij = 1.
Remark 3. If agent i and agent j are neighbors and agent i is not infected (xi = 0) and agent j
is not infected (xj = 0) or recovered (rj = R) the optimal strategies for their interaction are u
i
j = 1
and uji = 1, since if u
j
i = 1: Ji(u
i
j = 1)− Ji(uij = 0) = sij > 0 and if uij = 1: Jj(uji = 1)− Jj(uji =
0) = sji > 0 .
So defining the following sets:
Infectedi = {j ∈ Ni : xj = 1, rj < R} (12)
and |Infectedi| is the number of elements of Infectedi, we conclude that:
Ji = Ji(u
i
j : j ∈ Infectedi),
since the rest strategies are fixed. In this case, the computation of the equilibrium strategies is a
single objective, multi-variable, integer optimization problem for each agent, which can be solved
9
easily using the following algorithm for each agent in O(|Infectedi|(log(|Infectedi|) + 1)) iterations:
Algorithm 1: Solution of the optimization problem for each agent
Result: The optimal strategies (uij)
∗ for j ∈ Infectedi
Sort the parameters sij, j ∈ Infectedi in decreasing order;
Define the sequence of indices j1...j|Infectedi| to be the j-indices of the previous ordering;
Define the strategies u¯i0 = 0Infectedi , u¯ik = {uij1 = 1...uijk = 1, uijk+1 = 0...uij|Infectedi|=0},
k = 1...|Infectedi|;
k = 0;
∆Ji = 1;
while ∆Ji > 0 and k ≤ |Infectedi| do
∆Ji = sijk −Gipc(1− pc)k;
k = k + 1;
end
(uij)
∗ = u¯ik−1(jk = j);
Remark 4. The strategy profile uij = max{xi, 1 − xj} is a Nash equilibrium for the game with
perfect local state feedback (9), if ∀i 6∈ ∪iInfectedi : max{sij : j ∈ Infectedi} < Gipc
This equilibrium shows the phenomenon that in the case the agents are highly vulnerable to the
disease and they know the state of their neighbors, they communicate with all the healthy ones in
order to maximize their payoffs and the infected try to communicate also with their neighbors for
the same reason but they are banned by them. So, this equilibrium results to higher payoffs for the
non infected agents:
Ji =

∑
j∈Ni sij(1− xjX{rj<R}) , xi = 0 or ri = R
−Gi , xi = 1 and ri < R
(13)
4 Information for the distribution of the states
The second case that we study is the case where the agents have statistical information for the
distribution of the states, which in our case is a Bernoulli distribution, assuming that the agents
ignore the correlations between their states. We assume also that all the agents know the same
distribution with the same parameters and that they have no memory for the past values of these
parameters:
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IDi (k) = {px(k), pr(k)}, (14)
where
px(k) =
|{i : 1 ≤ ri(k) < R}|
N
, (15)
is the percentage of ill agents at day k and
pr(k) =
|{i : ri(k) = R}|
N
, (16)
is the percentage of recovered agents at day k.
Furthermore, we assume that each agent chooses the same probability to meet each one of her
neighbors and then makes di random experiments to decide if she will meet each one of them.
uij(k) =
 1 ,w.p. piu(k)0 , otherwise (17)
this is rational only if the utility earned from each interaction is the same from all the neighbors of
each agent: sij = si, ∀j ∈ Ni. We assume that this symmetry holds for this case. Consequently,
the strategy space of each agent is:
piu(k) ∈ [0, 1]. (18)
We then drop k in order to proceed with the analysis of one step of the game. In order to study the
equilibria of this game we have firstly to compute the expectation of the state of the agents based
on the available information (14). Thus, we compute at first the expectation of the next state of
an agent given the current states:
E{x+i |x, r} = 1− (1− xi)
∏
j∈Ni
(1− uijujipcxjX(rj<R)),
next we compute the expectation of the previous conditional expectation over all the states:
Ex,r
{
E{x+i |x, r}
}
= 1− (1− px)
∏
j∈Ni
(1− uijujipcpx(1− pr)),
and thus the criteria have the following form:
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Ji = si
∑
j∈Ni
uiju
j
i +
[
Gi(1− px)
∏
j∈Ni
(1− uijujipcpx(1− pr))−Gi
]
(1− pr),
where the strategies are random and uniform for all the neighbors of an agent according to eq.(17),
so we have to compute the expected criteria, given the probabilities of the uniform strategies:
Jˆi = E{Ji|piu, pju, j ∈ Ni} = sipiu
∑
j∈Ni
pju +
[
Gi(1− p0x)
∏
j∈Ni
(1− piupjupcp0x)−Gi
]
(1− pr) (19)
Each agent wants to maximize Jˆi w.r.t. p
i
u. However, computing the first two derivatives of Jˆi w.r.t.
piu we get:
∂Jˆi
∂piu
= si
∑
j∈Ni
pju −Gi(1− px)(1− pr)
∑
j∈Ni
pjup
cpx(1− pr)
∏
k∈Ni\{j}
(1− piupkupcpx(1− pr)),
and
∂2Jˆi
(∂piu)
2
= Gi(1−px)(1−pr)
∑
j∈Ni
pjup
cpx(1−pr)
∑
k∈Ni\{j}
pkup
cpx(1−pr)
∏
l∈Ni\{j,k}
(1−piuplupcpx(1−pr)) ≥ 0,
which indicate that each Jˆi is convex with respect to p
i
u, independently of the strategies p
j
u of the
other agents, so the possible equilibria are in {0, 1}N . In order to characterize the Nash equilibria
of this game we observe that it is strategically equivalent to the following one:
J˜i(p
i
u, p
−i
u ) = aip
i
u
∑
j∈Ni
pju +
∏
j∈Ni
(1− bpiupju), (20)
where:
ai =
si
Gi(1− px)(1− pr) , b = p
cpx(1− pr),
and
piu ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i.
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We proceed with the calculation of the best response for each agent. If agent i has mi of her
neighbors playing pju = 1 her payoff is:
J˜i(p
i
u,mi) = aimip
i
u + (1− bpiu)mi .
Thus:
J˜i(0,mi) = 1,
J˜i(1,mi) = aimi + (1− b)mi .
We define the following functions:
fi(m) = J˜i(1,m) = aim+ (1− b)m = aim+ em ln(1−b) (21)
The best response of each agent is:
BRi(mi) =
 1 , if fi(mi) > 10 , otherwise (22)
So, we have the following algorithm for the computation of the strategies corresponding to a Nash
equilibrium:
Algorithm 2: Computation of the NE strategies for the game with information for the dis-
tribution of the states
Result: The optimal strategies pi∗u
Set piu = 1, ∀i
Compute fi(mi), ∀i (mi = di)
while ∃fi(mi) ≤ 1 do
if fi(mi) ≤ 1 then
Set piu = 0
end
Compute new mi, ∀i Compute new fi(mi), ∀i
end
Proposition 3. There exists a Nash equilibrium of the game with statistical information for the
distribution of the states. Furthermore, Algorithm 2 converges to the Nash equilibrium in O(N2)
steps.
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Proof. To prove this proposition we firstly prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For the functions fi(m), defined in (21), there exists a unique m0 ∈ R+ such that
f(m0) = 1 and for all m > m0, m ∈ N : f(m) > 1
Proof. It is easily observed that fi(m) is convex and fi(0) = 1 for each i. So, if f
′
i(0) ≥ 0⇒ fi(m) >
1, ∀m, in this case m0 = 0. Else if f ′i(0) ≤ 0 ⇒ ∃!m0 ∈ R∗+ : f(m0) = 1 and ∀m > m0, m ∈ N :
f(m) > 1 due to the convexity of fi(m).
Due to this lemma, beginning with the maximum feasible value for mi (which is di) the changes
in the agents strategies from 1 to 0 can result only in the decrease of their neighbors mj’s and thus
it is possible to happen only one change of strategy (1→ 0) for each agent until fi(mi) ≥ 1, ∀i, so
the algorithm converges. Moreover, due to this observation, in the worst case the ‘while-loop’ will
run N times and so the algorithm will converge in O(N2) steps.
The point that the algorithm converges is a Nash equilibrium of the game, since the agents actions
are their best responses to their active contacts numbers mi’s and for this profile of mi’s no agent
will be benefited from a unilateral deviation from her action.
Furthermore, we should point that, since the algorithm is in fact a descent on the possible mi-
profiles, i.e. it initializes with all the contacts being active (mi = di, ∀i) and each mi decreases or
stays the same, the Nash equilibrium that the algorithm converges is the one corresponding to the
maximum possible sociability for the agents.
Remark 5. If for each agent i it holds that sidi + Gi(1− px)(1− pr)[(1− pcpx(1− pr))di − 1] > 0
then the strategy profile piu = 1,∀i is a N.E. of that game.
Proposition 4. The strategy profile piu = 0,∀i is again a N.E., since it results to indifference
between the unilateral changes of each agent.
5 Numerical studies
In this section we present several simulations for the social distancing games under the two different
information structures in order to compare the disease prevalence and the agents payoffs in both
cases, as well as the importance of some parameters of the model. For these simulations we consider
a repeated version of this game. The payoffs of the agents in this case have the form (7), indicating
14
the myopic behavior for the agents, who cannot predict the future consequences of their actions.
The strategies considered in the following simulations are the Nash Equilibrium strategies of the
static games of the previous sections repeated at each step of each game. The following two remarks
describe these strategies.
For the game with perfect local information we consider the following strategies:
Remark 6. 1. The strategy profile u(k) = 0∑N
i=1 di
, k = 1...K.
2. The strategy profile u∗(k), k = 1...K:
uij(k)
∗ =
 1, if xi(k) = 1 or {xi(k) = 0 and (rj(k) = 0 or rj(k) = 0)}The solution of algorithm 1, if xi(k) = 0 and 1 ≤ rj(k) < R
In the execution of algorithm 1 in this equation, the set Infectedi is defined as follows:
Infectedi = {j ∈ Ni : 1 ≤ rj(k) < R}
3. Any step-wise interchange of the two previous strategy profiles.
and for the game with statistical information we consider the following strategies:
Remark 7. 1. The strategy profile u(k) = 0∑N
i=1 di
, k = 1...K.
2. The strategy profile u∗(k), k = 1...K: The solution of Algorithm 2, where p0x = px(k) follows
the rule (16).
3. Any stepwise interchange of the two previous strategy profiles.
In practice, since both algorithms are initialized with all the social contacts being active, they
converge in the second category of strategies for both cases.
The simulations presented here have the following parameters. The underlying graph topology
is a random graph [44] with N = 1000 agents and adjacency probability p = 1%, and thus average
degree d¯ = 10. The recovery period is 14 days. The sociability parameters sij are random numbers
in (0, 1). The agents are divided into two groups the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable. For the
vulnerable Gi = 10000 and for the non-vulnerable Gi = 1000. The percentage of the vulnerable
in the community is 20%. The initial percentage of infected agents is 1%. The basic reproduction
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number of the disease R0 = 2, so as for the disease to be epidemic and for social distancing to be
necessary.
In Figure 1 we indicate the effects of the social distancing games with statistical information
and with perfect local information on the disease prevalence and on the sociability of the agents and
compare these two games. In Table 5 we present some numerical characteristics of these curves.
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Figure 1: Infection, recovery and sociability curves for the game with information for the distribution
of the states
Characteristics of Infection and Sociability for the Games with Different Information
Infection Peak Total Infection Minimum Sociability
No game 30.3% 78.7% 100%
Perfect local feedback 9.1% 43.7% 94.2%
Information for the distri-
bution of the infected
4.2% 33.5% 22.9%
Table 1: Table to compare the infection and sociability for the games with different information
We conclude that the game with information for the distribution of the states almost extinguish
the epidemic behavior of the disease - the infection curve is similar with the infection curve of a
disease with R0 ≤ 1 - while the perfect local state feedback game reduces significantly the disease
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outspread, but it does not extinguish the epidemic. However, this result comes at a high cost for
the agents, since in presence of an augmented fear of infection due to lack of information about
the health status of their friends, they avoid many of their social interactions. In comparison with
the perfect local state feedback repeated game the social distancing is large, there exist only 22.9%
active social interactions, than 94.2% in the other case. This remarkable difference on the agents
behavior affects significantly their payoffs. As we observe in Figure 2, the average payoff of the game
with perfect local information are much higher than the average payoff of the game with statistical
information. Moreover, we must underline that for the vulnerable agents the difference of their
payoffs between the two games is large, as they pay much higher the cost of not being informed
about the health state of their contacts and get infected.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the payoffs of the agents for the two games
Due to that fact the vulnerable agents can be considered as key players for these games, since
they tend to play conservatively and thus enhance the social distancing. So, in Figure 3 we show
the effect of the percentage of vulnerable agents in the community to the infection peak and to the
total number of infected agents for the game with perfect local information and in Figure 4 we show
the same effects for the game with statistical information. In these figures the mean value of 30
simulations is depicted at each point of the plots and the red lines are the linear regression curves
for our experiments on different percentages.
The result is the expected one, that in both games the percentage of the vulnerable agents is
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Figure 3: Correlation of the percentage of vulnerable agents with the infection outspread for the
perfect local feedback information game
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Figure 4: Correlation of the percentage of vulnerable agents with the infection outspread for the
game with information for the distribution of the states
negatively correlated to the disease outspread. However, in the game with statistical information
(Figure 4) their role seem to be less important than in the perfect local information game, because
the variations of the peaks and the total number of infected agents with respect to the vulnerable
18
agents percentage are by far smaller.
6 Case Studies and Discussion
In the previous sections, we have analyzed and compared the Nash equilibrium strategies of the
agents for the cases of perfect local state feedback information and statistical information for the
distribution of the states. In this section, we consider several variations of the initial problem and
examine, through simulations, the effects of the varying parameters on the behavior of the agents and
on the outspread of the epidemic. The first variation we study concerns the quality of the available
information, for the case that the agents possess statistical information for the distribution of the
states. The second variation considers the risk perception, modeled by the vulnerability parameters,
to depend on the infection outspread and the capacity of health care system. And the third variation
takes under consideration the effects of the graph topology.
6.1 Fake information for the distribution of the states
A first modified scenario we examine is the case that the information the agents possess about the
distribution of the states is fake or biased. This is an interesting and in some cases realistic scenario,
since the agents are rarely able or have the time to investigate verified data about the outspread
of the disease, but they usually get informed through mass media or social media. Consequently,
the information they get is usually exaggerated or understated. The spread of fake news is another
factor affecting the information quality and thus the decisions of the agents. Moreover, in many
cases the lack of diagnostic tests in the community makes the knowledge of the accurate infection
level impossible.
So, we consider the following modification of the model of section 4:
pfx = fpx (23)
where pfx is the available fake information of the agents and f is a coefficient indicating its deviation
from the actual information px. So, we get the following simulations (Figure:5) indicating the effects
of an overestimation of the infection level (f = 2) and an underestimation of the infection level
(f = 0.5), in comparison with the game with actual information (all the parameters are the same
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with the other simulations, as in section 5). In table 2 are presented some numerical characteristics
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Figure 5: Infection, recovery and sociability curves for games with fake information for the distri-
bution of the states
of the previous curves:
Fake Information Consequences
Infection Peak Total Infection Minimum Sociability
Actual Information 3.7% 25.6% 23.9%
Overestimation of Infection (2px) 1.9% 11.1% 19.5%
Underestimation of Infection (0.5px) 5.9% 36.5% 52.6%
Table 2: Table to compare the infection for games with actual and fake information
We observe that in the case of an overestimation of the infection level the agents care more
to follow social distancing and the disease prevalence is kept at low levels, while in the case of
underestimation of the infection the agents do not care so much and the disease prevalence is
higher. It seems rational that the agents are more benefited from a low prevalence so it may be
profitable for them to receive an overestimation of the infection level. However, when applying social
distancing they pay the costs of the effort to eradicate the epidemic, so it is interesting to examine
how their payoffs vary when they receive fake or biased information. From Figure 6, we observe
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Figure 6: Payoffs of the agents in the case of fake information
that the non vulnerable agents are slightly benefited from an underestimation of the infection level,
since they are not precarious and their profits depend mostly on their social contacts. However,
they have also small gains in the case of an overestimation of the infection level since they stay safe
and not infected. Contrary to the non vulnerable agents, the vulnerable agents are damaged from
an underestimation of the infection level, since they may get infected and suffer a lot and they are
benefited significantly from an overestimation of the infection level, which scares the whole society
and leads to strict social distancing, saving them this way from a possible infection.
It is also interesting to point out the correlation of the infection outspread and the agents’ payoffs
with the fake information coefficient (f). As we can see in Figure 7 the infection outspread and
the fake information coefficient have a definitely negative correlation, with overestimation leading
to very low infection levels and underestimation to high infection levels. Moreover, interestingly,
the agents’ payoffs present a minimum average value when the information is near to the actual
one and they seem to be benefited from fake or biased information. However, we should point out
here that the average payoff of all the agents is illustrated in Figure 7 and this is the reason for
the existence of that minimum, since, according to Figure 6, the non vulnerable agents - who are
the majority - are slightly benefited from a small f and the vulnerable agents - even if they are
minority - are benefited significantly form a larger f , so the average payoff has this behavior.
These observations could be useful for a social planer, with an aim to avoid the spreading of the
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Figure 7: Correlation of the coefficient of fake information with the infection outspread and the
agents’ payoffs
disease, in order to achieve social distancing without imposing it by law but by manipulating the
agents strategies through the broadcasted fake or biased information.
6.2 Vulnerabilities depending on the infection outspread and the health
care system capacity
Another scenario is that the vulnerability parameters of the agents (Gi) depend on the level of
infection in the community. This is an interesting scenario in practice, since the health systems
worldwide have finite (and usually small) capacity, so if the number of infected agents who need
health care pass a certain level it is not probable for the next agents who will get infected to have
access in the necessary facilities.
We model this phenomenon considering the vulnerability parameters as functions of the infection
ratio, in the model of section 4 . At first, we examine the case of linear dependence:
Gi = Gi(px) = G
0
iαpx (24)
G0i are the constant vulnerability parameters used in all the previous simulations. Choosing
α = 1
prefx
we can define a reference infection level prefx , where the agents will play as in the case of
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constant vulnerability parameters G0i . Below this level, they will be indifferent for the effects of the
disease on them and care more for their social interactions and above this level they will be more
worried about the disease and follow social distancing strategies.
This is confirmed by Figure: 8, where all the parameters, except the vulnerability parameters,
are the same with the other simulations, as in section 5.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
days
0
0.02
0.04
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f
in
fe
ct
ed
 a
ge
nt
s
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
days
0
0.2
0.4
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f
re
co
ve
rd
 a
ge
nt
s
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
days
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f
ac
tiv
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
Figure 8: Infection, recovery and sociability curves when the vulnerability parameters have a pro-
portional dependence on the infection outspread
It is interesting to point that the agents do keep the infection level below the reference value, in
this simulation prefx = 5%, for all the time.
We also examine the case of step-function dependence, where there exists a critical infection
level pcrx above which the agents play with parameters G
0
i and below which they care very little
about the effects of the disease on them.
Gi = Gi(px) =
 G0i /M , px < pcrxG0i , else (25)
where M is a large number e.g., M = 100. In Figure 9, pcrx = 5%.
It should be pointed here that in the first case (Fig:8) the peak of the infection is 4.3% and the
total number of infected agents is 41.3%, while in the second case (Fig:9) the peak is 5.1% and the
total number of infected agents is 52.4%, which indicates a much worse behavior of the agents in
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Figure 9: Infection, recovery and sociability curves when the vulnerability parameters have a step-
wise dependence on the infection outspread
the second case.
6.3 Effects of the graph topology on the outspread of the disease
Except of the agents strategies of social distancing, another very important factor which affects
the outspread of the disease is the topology of the underlying network which represents the social
interactions of the agents. So, we present here some simulations to indicate the effects of the graph
topology on the spreading of the disease and the effectiveness of the agents strategies.
At first, we do not consider a social distancing game, so every two neighbors communicate freely
with each other (wij = aij). In Figure 10 we observe the infection curves for four different graph
topologies: random graph [44], stochastic block model, scale free network [47],[45] and small world
network [48]. In every case we have chosen the network parameters in a way that the graphs have
almost the same average degree (d¯ ≈ 10), since it is a key parameter determining the scale of the
infection level, as shown in (6). In table 3 we present some numerical characteristics of these curves.
We can make several interesting observations from Figure 10 and Table 3. The scale free network
with some central nodes with large degrees presents very early a sharp and high infection, while the
small world network, which arises from a lattice and thus has high regularity and all the nodes have
24
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Figure 10: Infection curves for different graph topologies for the case of no social distacning
Topology Comparison (No Social Distancing)
Average Degree Infection Peak Total Infection
Random Graph 9.8 36.2% 82.8%
Stochastic Block Model 10.2 22.1% 74.1%
Scale Free Network 9.9 41.3% 72.3%
Small World Network 10 17.9% 80.9%
Table 3: Table to compare the infection for different graph topologies in the case of no social
distancing
almost the same degrees, present a much lower but extended infection curve. However, the total
numbers of infected agents are almost the same. Moreover, the stochastic block model - being an ill
connected coalition of well connected random graphs - has a similar, in shape, reaction curve with
the random graph, but with lower peak and significantly lower total number of infected agents.
Next, we proceed with the numerical study of the social distancing games with the two different
information structures. We begin with the game with perfect local information, illustrated in Figure
11 and Table 4.
From these simulations we can derive the following conclusions. Firstly, in the scale free network
the disease spreads quickly, even in the case that the agents follow social distancing strategies. Thus,
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Figure 11: Infection curves for different graph topologies for the game with perfect local information
Topology Comparison (Perfect Info Game)
Infection Peak Total Infection Minimum Sociability
Random Graph 10.2% 42.2% 94.8%
Stochastic Block Model 6.1% 38.8% 96.3%
Scale Free Network 21.7% 49.8% 85.7%
Small World Network 4.1% 18.9% 97.5%
Table 4: Table to compare the infection for different graph topologies for the case of the perfect
local information game
we observe the highest peak, the greatest total prevalence and consequently the lowest level on the
agents sociability in their effort to flatten this curve. In the cases of small world network and
stochastic block model the infection peaks are low. Thus, the agents are not so concerned about
the disease and relax their social distancing, resulting in second waves of the epidemic in both
cases. However, in the case of the stochastic block model the duration of the waves is larger and
consequently the total prevalence is also larger. Finally, in the case of the random graph we observe
a greater peak than in the stochastic block model, but due to the response of the agents and the
absence of remote cliques - which may act as sources of infection - the disease is eliminated in this
case and we do not observe a second wave, resulting in a similar total prevalence with the stochastic
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block model.
Following that, we present simulations for the game with statistical information, illustrated in
Figure 12 and Table 5.
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Figure 12: Infection curves for different graph topologies for the game with statistical information
Topology Comparison (Statistical Info Game)
Infection Peak Total Infection Minimum Sociability
Random Graph 3.5% 31.2% 36.1%
Stochastic Block Model 4.0% 18.3% 23.4%
Scale Free Network 4.6% 19.9% 17.2%
Small World Network 2.9% 7.1% 52.3%
Table 5: Table to compare the infection for different graph topologies for the case of the game with
statistical information
There are several interesting observations for this case also. At first, in all graph topologies the
infection level is kept very low but with a high cost on the sociability of the agents. Secondly, there
do not exist significant differences on the peaks of the infection but there exist on the epidemic’s du-
ration, affecting this way its total prevalence. In the small world network the epidemic is eliminated
quickly and with a comparatively small effort from the agents, resulting in a low total prevalence.
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In the scale free network and the stochastic block model the epidemic is also eliminated but has
a relatively larger duration, resulting in similarly larger prevalence. Finally, in the random graph
topology the epidemic lasts long and has the greatest prevalence. This phenomenon is probably
a result of the well mixing of the agents, that arises more in the random graph topology, which
contributes to the persistence of the disease even in the case that the agents cut several of their
contacts.
7 Conclusion
A game-theoretic approach of social distancing has been considered. In the simple model proposed,
the main parameters under examination are the network describing the structure of the interactions
among the agents, which changes according to their rationally chosen strategies and the available
information during the decision making. The effects of the spontaneous social distancing behavior on
the prevalence of the epidemic is investigated both analytically and numerically through simulations
on artificial networks. At the current stage, the proposed model is not intended for quantitative
policy suggestions, since on the one hand it is simplistic and on the other hand the knowledge of
realistic values for the parameters modeling human behavior requires real observations, many data
and a proper statistical processing of them. However, it may be useful to offer a paradigm on the
way the agents decide to adopt social distancing and the effects of these decisions on the prevalence
of an epidemic.
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